Economic transition and speculative urbanisation in China: gentrification versus dispossession by Shin, Hyun Bang
  
Hyun Bang Shin  
Economic transition and speculative 
urbanisation in China: gentrification versus 
dispossession 




 Original citation: 
Shin, Hyun Bang (2015) Economic transition and speculative urbanisation in China: gentrification 
versus dispossession. Urban Studies, 53 (3). pp. 471-489. ISSN 0042-0980 
DOI: 10.1177/0042098015597111 
 
© 2015 The Author  
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/62608/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: July 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or 
other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research 
Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further 
distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may 
freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences 
between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if 





Economic transition and speculative urbanisation in China: 
Gentrification versus dispossession 
Hyun Bang Shin 
Department of Geography and Environment 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
THIS ARTICLE IS TO APPEAR IN THE JOURNAL, URBAN STUDIES ( ISSN 
0042-0980). FOR MORE DETAILS, E-MAIL: H.B.SHIN@LSE.AC.UK  
Abstract  
Gentrification requires properties to be available for investment through market 
transactions. In mainland China which has gone through transition from a planned 
to a market economy, it is necessary to unleash decommodified real estate 
properties and make them amenable to investment. This entails inhabitants’ 
dispossession to dissociate them from claiming their rights to the properties and to 
their neighbourhoods. This paper argues that while China’s urban accumulation 
may have produced new-build gentrification, redevelopment projects have been 
targeting dilapidated urban spaces that are yet to be fully converted into 
commodities. This means that dispossession is a precursor to gentrification. 
Dispossession occurs through both coercion and co-optation, and reflects the path-
dependency of China’s socialist legacy. The findings contribute to the debates on 
contextualising the workings of gentrification in the global South, and highlight the 
importance of identifying multiple urban processes at work to produce 
gentrification and speculative urban accumulation. 
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Introduction 
When the Royal Institute of British Architects awarded a top prize to Zaha 
Hadid Architects (ZHA) in 2013 for their design of a new mega-complex in 
Beijing, the news was received with astonishment by a Beijing-based non-
governmental organisation (Wainright 2013). On the developer’s 
promotional web site, the mega-complex was described as “a large 
development comprising a compelling mix of office and retail space”.1 It 
was located just inside the eastern section of Beijing’s 2nd ring-road. 
Completed in 2012, the new development sat in the area like an alien ship, 
having been built to replace historic urban fabric, dwellings and local 
residents. The NGO issued a letter criticising the award, arguing that it 
would only propel developers and local officials to continue their current 
practices of neglecting local residents’ legal rights and cultural heritage 
preservation. ZHA retorted that “When ZHA was appointed to the project, 
no buildings existed on the site which is adjacent to large scale 
commercial/civic buildings and one of Beijing’s busiest motorways” (cited 
in Wainwright 2013). 
The above episode connotes many things about the nature of mainland 
China’s speculative urbanisation. The Galaxy SOHO project represents a 
number of new-build, commercial gentrification projects that have been 
changing China’s urban landscape. Such projects are meant to realise a 
completely different land use, accommodating brand new activities that are 
beyond the reach of those residents whose homes are subject to deliberate 
destruction or domicide (Qin 2013). In particular, the role of an 
entrepreneurial state (Shin 2009) is prominently pronounced in ZHA’s 
                                                 
1 Galaxy SOHO web site, URL: http://galaxysoho.sohochina.com (accessed 12 November 
2014) 
 Page 3 
response. That is, its role to practice the wholesale clearance of the site, 
involving demolition of dwellings and people’s dispossession, to make it 
susceptible to operation of real estate capital. This role of the state in 
China’s urban development and residents’ dispossession are the main 
themes this paper interrogates. 
Neil Smith once argued that gentrification “is a structural product of the 
land and housing markets” (1979:546). In mainland China, the decades-long 
socialisation of property ownership during the planned economy era 
resulted in effective elimination of real estate markets and prohibition of 
opportunities to profit from properties. The proliferation of China’s urban 
development projects to install new residential and commercial spaces 
during the reform era required unleashing of previously decommodified real 
estate properties (Wu 1996, 2009). The legal conditions for making this 
possible were established by the land and housing reform measures in the 
1980s and 1990s. However, these reform measures did not automatically 
translate into the availability of commodified real estate properties for 
investment and transaction. State intervention would be a means to bring 
dilapidated neighbourhoods and other urban spaces into the market domain, 
thus releasing the land assets to be subject to further accumulation and 
make-over to meet the state vision of urban development. This also means 
inhabitants’ dispossession of their rights to their properties and their place of 
inhabitance. 
In this regard, this paper argues that dispossession (Harvey 2003, 2005) 
occurs as a precursor to gentrification in order to convert land and housing 
into commodities. Here, gentrification is broadly defined as a process of 
“capital reinvestment in the built environment accompanying the 
displacement of existing users, be they inhabitants or workers” (Lees, Shin 
and López-Morales 2015:448; see also Smith 2002 and Clark 2005). The 
empirical cases for these discussions are based on (1) primary and 
secondary data (interviews with local residents, officials, and experts, 
observation, and local archives) collected from Guangzhou during the 
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fieldwork between 2009 and 2011, and (2) post-fieldwork follow-up studies 
based on extensive archival research on media outputs and governmental 
records. 
Through the use of case studies and highlighting the presence of multiple 
urban processes at work, this paper aims to contribute to the debates on 
contextualising the workings of gentrification in the global South (see Lees 
2012; Lees, Shin and López-Morales 2015; Lemanski 2014) by examining 
the experience of China that has gone through economic transition as well 
as radical socio-spatial restructuring in recent decades. While the paper 
acknowledges the contributions made by the existing literature on 
examining China’s urban redevelopment practices from a new-build 
gentrification perspective (e.g. Wang and Lau 2009; He 2007), it attempts to 
highlight the distinctive urban processes that have unfolded in times of 
China’s transition from a planned economy to a market one, and illuminate 
on the co-existence of multiple urban processes of dispossession and 
gentrification, which reflect the socialist legacy and are pertinent to the 
transformation of China’s urban spaces into market commodities. 
Conditioning ‘gentrification' in urban China through speculative 
urbanisation 
For mainland China that has experienced transition from a planned to a 
market economy, it is imperative to understand the specific urban conditions 
that have shaped the emerging land and housing markets, and that influence 
the rise of gentrification. In this respect, particular attention is paid to 
China’s urbanisation that involves speculative investments in the built 
environment or what critics such as David Harvey and Henri Lefebvre refer 
to as the second(ary) circuit of capital accumulation. The usual formulation 
of capital switching sees the flow of surplus capital into the built 
environment as a spatial fix to address over-accumulation crisis in the 
primary circuit of industrial production (Harvey 1978), but China’s 
urbanisation involves mutual reinforcement between the primary and 
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secondary circuits of accumulation (see Shin 2014a:510-512). In other 
words, China’s drive to become the ‘factory of the world’ based on cheap 
labour force requires productive investment in fixed assets to provide 
necessary infrastructure, facilities and collective consumption. Fixed assets 
investment has been a key contributor to China’s economic development. 
The resulting rise of urban agglomeration across the country calls for further 
fixed assets investment to support the urban way of life. In short, 
urbanisation has become synonym with accumulation (Hsing 2010; Wu 
2009; Shin 2014a). 
Urbanisation in mainland China also entails what You-tien Hsing refers to 
as the “urbanization of the local state” (Hsing 2010:6), driven by local state 
leaders to address their political aspiration and to legitimise their positions 
as vanguards of new Chinese urbanism. The resulting territorial expansion 
to accumulate land assets owes primarily to the fact that local states 
(especially at the municipal scale such as municipal and district 
governments as well as their affiliated institutions) have become de facto 
landlords (Shin 2009). This owes much to the land reform, which paved the 
way to land-based accumulation (Hsing 2010; Lin et al. 2014). While 
China’s dualist land ownership dictates that urban and rural land is owned 
by the state and rural collectives respectively, two key pieces of legislation, 
the land reform from the 1980s made it possible for the land use right to be 
detached from a bundle of property rights and be subject to market 
transactions. In other words, the land use right has become commodified, 
laying the foundation for the emergence of urban land markets. The result 
was that urban governments as agents of the state were given the power to 
administer these transactions and produce land-use master plans. They were 
granted a greater degree of power to control and regulate urban development 
within their jurisdiction. The lease of land use rights effectively made urban 
governments as the actual managers of state land properties (Haila 1999). 
This is further strengthened by the fact that as far as legal provisions are 
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concerned, rural collectives are not able to hand over their land rights to a 
third party for nonagricultural use (Cao et al. 2008:24).2 
The importance of land reform lies in the huge contribution of the land-
derived revenues to local government (as opposed to the central 
government) finance in the form of extra-budgetary revenues. This owes 
much to China’s fiscal reform from 1994, which increased the tax extraction 
power of the central government, taking a lion’s share of the budgetary 
revenues: for instance, as for the value-added tax, 75 percent is apportioned 
to the central government (Zhan 2011). Extra-budgetary revenue is defined 
“as the various sorts of non-tax revenue collected by government agencies, 
institutions, and social organizations when performing government-
delegated duties or acting on behalf of the government in accordance with 
laws and regulations” (Zhan 2011:500). While the extra-budgetary revenue 
used to account as much as 80% of China’s local tax revenue before the 
1994 fiscal reform, the share began to dwindle from the early 2000s, but 
still made up more than 30% in 2006 (Zhan 2011:502). Of all the 
subcategories that fall under the extra-budgetary revenues, administrative 
charges are found out to be the largest (Zhan 2011:501). Fees imposed upon 
transferring land use rights to end-users such as developers or upon 
converting land use designation are major components of such 
administrative charges. In the case of Hangzhou, the proportion of land 
revenue to budgetary local revenue turned out to be 103.4% in 2009, while 
the figures for Beijing and Shanghai were 45.8% and 41.1% respectively 
(Wu 2011:254). These land-derived extra-budgetary revenues have emerged 
as a key source of financing fixed assets investments (Lin et al. 2014). The 
fiscal arrangement provides incentives for urban governments to bring more 
lands into their urban land reserves, facilitating urban territorial expansion 
through land-taking and conversion of existing urban lands to put them into 
                                                 
2 Nevertheless, illegal transfer of land rights prevailed in the process of rural-to-urban land 
use conversion (see for example, Lin and Ho 2005). 
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a higher and better use. This involves transfer of ownership of land use 
rights. 
Since the 1990s, China’s urban socio-spatial landscape has been profoundly 
rewritten, influenced in particular by the ways in which land use rights for 
residential and commercial uses have witnessed much higher prices than 
industrial land that is often hugely subsidised to entice industrial capital 
(Cao et al. 2008; Wang and Murie 2000). Instead of improving 
neighbourhood conditions through the upgrading of individual dwellings 
and provision of facilities, wholesale demolition and reconstruction have 
been the norms of urban development, resulting in the speedy reconstruction 
of sizeable housing estates as well as commercial and business districts. 
Mega-displacement of local residents turned out to be a sharing experience 
among major cities as a consequence (see Fang and Zhang 2003; Shin 
2014a; Yang and Chang 2007; see also Chapter 7 in Lees, Shin and López-
Morales, in press). 
Urban restructuring in China: Competing perspectives 
Under these contexts, China’s urbanisation that involves the accumulation 
of commodified residential and commercial properties has drawn attention 
of researchers who analyse the process of socio-spatial restructuring from 
the perspective of gentrification.3 In Chinese, two expressions are used 
interchangeably: shenshihua, which is a direct translation of the English 
expression; and zhongcanjiecenghua, which can be interpreted as 
‘transformation into middle-class areas’ (see Qiu 2002 and Wu and Yin 
2008 for instance). Earlier works on China’s gentrification were 
exploratory, probing the implications of Western gentrification on 
understanding China’s urban development or addressing the country’s 
                                                 
3 Scholars examining rapid urban development and socio-spatial restructuring usually use 
terminologies such as chengshi gaizao (urban redevelopment), jiucheng gengxin (old-city 
renewal) or simply chaiqian (demolition and relocation).  
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shortcomings of rapid urbanisation (Xue 1999; Meng 2000). Sometimes, 
gentrification was recognised as a process confined to a small number of 
neighbourhoods located close to central business districts (Qiu 2002). The 
focus on inner-city or old-city areas is also apparent in some of the latest 
works such as Zhang et al. (2013). Such tendency to focus on investigating 
the presence of gentrification in city centres is not so surprising, given the 
earlier formulation of gentrification in Western cities (Glass 1964), which  
originally conceptualised gentrification as affecting primarily inner-city 
working class neighbourhoods. 
Some of the latest literature on China’s experience of gentrification echoes 
the recent debates in the Western literature, which increasingly discuss 
‘new-build’ and ‘state-led’ gentrification (see Hackworth and Smith 2001; 
Davidson and Lees 2010). It is argued that because of China’s integration 
with the global economy, gentrification in China increasingly displays 
more similarities with the West (Huang and Yang 2010). Urban 
redevelopment based on wholesale clearance of existing buildings, 
displacement of residents and reconstruction to accommodate upmarket 
commercial housing, commercial and business spaces has been recognised 
as the main driver of producing gentrification (Qiu 2002; Song and Zhu 
2010; Wang and Lau 2009). Reflecting the new-build nature of most urban 
projects in Chinese cities, new-build gentrification has been identified as 
the prevailing characteristic of China’s gentrification (He 2010). The 
strong interventionist role of the state is also reflected in the coining of the 
term ‘state-sponsored’ gentrification (He 2007), though the unique nature 
and means of state intervention in Chinese cities would not be the entirely 
the same as those in the global North (Song and Wu 2010). 
However, the existing studies from and outside of China on China’s 
gentrification often fall short of discussing how the local state at the 
municipal scale makes this process possible by bringing the immobile 
properties (land and housing) into the market domain. Dilapidated 
neighbourhoods remain disjoined from the emerging land and housing 
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markets for various reasons. First of all, dilapidated neighbourhoods are 
disjoined, because dilapidated public rental dwellings had been exempted 
from privatisation and thus retained the features of pre-reform tenure 
practices. Also, urban spaces are sites of contention due to fragmented 
claims on properties involving a number of actors such as state enterprises 
and government institutions, homeowners, public rental tenants, village 
collectives and so on (Hsing 2010). Such constraints often make market 
transactions of, for example, owner-occupied dwellings (especially by 
individuals) difficult to take place, discouraging the rise of ‘first-wave’ 
gentrification (see also Kovács et al. 2013 for a similar case in Budapest). 
State-led redevelopment frequently involves lengthy negotiations among the 
aforementioned actors, and stalled negotiations often become barriers to 
redevelopment. There is a need for dissecting the processes of urban 
transformation so that China’s challenge to bring previously decommodified 
properties into the market domain is clearly differentiated from the usual 
processes of gentrification seen elsewhere in capitalist economies. This is 
where accumulation by dispossession could be considered as a means of 
analysing the processes of releasing publicly or communally owned assets 
in order to set the gentrification in motion. 
David Harvey in his discussion of the ‘new imperialism’ revisits Karl 
Marx’s thesis of ‘primitive accumulation’ (Harvey 2003). In contrast with 
Marx who focused on the role of primitive accumulation as a means to 
institute the transition of the ‘mode of production’ and early-stage capitalist 
accumulation that overcame feudal constraints, Harvey reinterprets 
primitive accumulation as a more generalised mechanism of capitalist 
accumulation in a contemporary (increasingly neoliberal) world. It is argued 
that accumulation by dispossession (ABD) is a modern, and on-going, form 
of primitive accumulation, searching for extra domains of accumulation. 
According to Harvey (2005), four main features of ABD include (1) 
privatisation and commodification accompanying the transfer of public or 
communal assets to be subject to the new avenue of accumulation, (2) 
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(speculative and predatory) financialisation involving dispossession of 
assets such as pension funds, (3) crisis management and manipulation that 
results in the devaluing of assets in crisis-ridden countries, and (4) state 
redistribution in disfavour of lower classes. In the process of ABD, what is 
being subject to dispossession is not simply physical or financial assets but 
people’s rights to dispose these assets and other resources as they wish. 
Thus, “[a]ccumulation by dispossession is about plundering, robbing other 
people of their rights”.4 In other words, “[d]ispossession entails the loss of 
rights” (Harvey 2005:178). 
Among the major features of ABD listed above, this paper is primarily 
concerned with the first and fourth features, that is, the privatisation and 
commodification of former public or communal assets and the state 
redistribution in disfavour of lower classes. These have profound impact on 
the rise of real estate markets in times of China’s transition from a planned 
to a market economy, and people’s differentiated access to the markets. 
Privatisation of public or communal assets, “the cutting edge of 
accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2003:157), converts a range of 
collective rights into private property rights, accompanying the transfer of 
public or communal assets into a small number of private hands. It thus 
enables the capital “to open up new fields for capital accumulation in 
domains formerly regarded off-limits to the calculus of profitability” 
(Harvey 2007:35). Eminent domain as a means of taking land and housing 
against the will of individual owners also becomes part of the ABD, as the 
owners are ripped off their rights to dispose of their properties in exchange 
for meagre compensation that does not reflect the future increase in the 
value of those properties after redevelopment (Ramanathan 2010; López-
Morales 2011). The use of eminent domain in particular is what positions 
                                                 
4 See “A conversation with David Harvey”, Logos: A journal of modern society & culture 
5(1), URL: http://www.logosjournal.com/issue_5.1/harvey.htm (accessed 10 November 
2014). 
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the ABD as one of key instruments to urban accumulation, as it removes 
barriers to accumulation through state-led land assembly (e.g. Levien 2011). 
The ABD is often associated with ‘extra-economic means’ of dispossession 
that evades existing norms and often involves use of violence (Glassman 
2006; Levien 2011), for dispossession is a highly political process that does 
not often follow simple economic logic. However, Harvey warns against the 
isolation of the ABD to the domain of extra-economic means of 
dispossession only, arguing that “[t]he formal distinction between extra-
economic and economic power does not work in practice” (Harvey 
2006:159). The attention to both extra-economic and economic power to 
enable dispossession is particularly important in China, which has seen a 
prominent role of land to facilitate urbanisation and land-based 
accumulation as discussed earlier. Economically, China’s land reform 
positioned local states (especially at municipal scale) as de facto landlords 
(Shin 2009), and enabled the transfer of land use rights in exchange for land 
use premiums that helped ease constraints on local government finance (Lin 
et al. 2014). This economic motivation as well as the political ambitions of 
the state elites further propels the process of land expropriation or eminent 
domain, which entails the extra-economic process of dispossessing the 
rights of users and owners of such properties. This process involves a 
nuanced use of state power to make this possible.  
To understand the above processes more vividly, this paper now turns to the 
examples from Guangzhou, first summarising the urban redevelopment 
contexts of Guangzhou, and then introducing the two case studies of urban 
redevelopment. One of the cases involves redevelopment of an inner-city 
neighbourhood located in Guangzhou’s traditional urban core. The other 
case is an urbanised former village. These neighbourhoods symbolise those 
numerous neighbourhoods that are subject to the advancement of real estate 
capital in times of urban transition under the newly emerging market 
economy. 
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Redeveloping Guangzhou 
Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong province, was designated in 1984 as 
one of the 14 Open Coastal Cities, and has been a major economic centre. 
Guangzhou’s urban redevelopment has been accelerated since its successful 
bid in 2004 for the 2010 Asian Games (Shin 2014b), particularly targeting 
dilapidated and informal urban spaces that did not conform to the municipal 
vision to modernise and achieve a global profile. The then mayor of 
Guangzhou asserted that “the government takes the responsibility of 
demolition and relocation. After completing relocation, social investment 
will be invited for construction” (Nanfang Daily 2007). Here, social 
investment would largely refer to the investment by developers, 
supplementing financial inputs from the municipal and district governments 
who are to bear the expenses for demolition and relocation of residents. This 
signalled a Guangzhou version of ‘public-private partnership’ under the 
state leadership (Shin 2014c). 
Urban redevelopment efforts were further supported by a province-wide 
initiative called the Three Olds (sanjiu) redevelopment policy, which 
materialised before the 2010 Asian Games (Ye 2011). Three Olds comprised 
of old inner-city neighbourhoods, old industrial (brownfield) sites, and old 
urbanised villages. In Guangzhou, there were about 494km2 subject to the 
Three Olds policy, accounting for 42.4% of all Three Olds areas in 
Guangdong province. 11% of Guangzhou’s Three Old areas were old inner-
city neighbourhoods, while 53.9% were urbanised villages (see Schoon 
2014). In January 2010, it was reported that Guangzhou aimed to complete 
the wholesale redevelopment of 120km2 as well as comprehensive 
improvement of another 100km2 by 2020 (Nanfang Daily 2010). China’s 
urbanisation has been characterised by land-based accumulation (see Hsing 
2010), benefiting heavily from the use of land assets by urban governments 
to drive economic development. The promotion of the Three Olds 
redevelopment would contribute heavily to Guangzhou’s securement of 
additional land resources for further accumulation. This was evident in the 
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statement by the spokesperson for Guangzhou’s Three Olds redevelopment 
office, who specified that “every year, it will be possible to supply 10-
20km2…which will resolve the land problems that would constrain 
Guangzhou’s development in the coming ten years” (Nanfang Daily 2010). 
Another public administration expert in Guangzhou also ascertains: 
“There have been attempts to re-vamp the city to secure land so that the municipal 
government could do many things before the Asian Games. These were to address 
limited land supply issues, and happened a lot in the Pearl River Delta region. As a 
result, farmlands got smaller and smaller” (interviewed on 16 May 2011) 
As argued by George Lin and his colleagues (2014:18), “the growth and 
spatiality of urbanism in the Chinese context” is influenced by “the 
contestation of state power, mobilisation of capital, and commodification 
and development of land”. In Guangzhou, land commodification was known 
to be taking place more intensely from the early 2000s (Lin et al. 2014:13). 
Land conveyance income enjoyed by the city had risen steadily throughout 
the 2000s in both absolute and relative amounts. As a share of total 
municipal fiscal income, the size of land conveyance income reached about 
25% by 2009 (ibid.). Furthermore, land conveyance income was an 
important contributor to the fixed assets investment, reaching about 40% of 
total fixed assets investment during the first half of the 2000s and more than 
60% between 2005 and 2009 (>100% in 2007 in particular) (Lin et al. 
2014:14-15). Therefore, the promotion of the Three Olds redevelopment 
would address multiple purposes of urban beautification, modernisation and 
land-derived revenue generation by means of enlarging its land reserves for 
residential and commercial uses. The implementation of the Three Olds 
redevelopment programme also helps “preventing the decline of the real 
estate investment in the urban areas” (Schoon 2014:111). It also brings 
together the multiple layers of local states such as the district and municipal 
governments together by providing financial incentives to encourage district 
governments to be more active in the successful implementation of land 
assembly and redevelopment. As Sonia Schoon (2013:230-231) explains, 
“[t]he district government [under the municipal government] that is 
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responsible for implementing the redevelopment process now also receives 
fixed compensation related to the land auction value added in the proportion 
2:8 shared with the municipal government, in order to become a motivated 
driving force. Before, districts were reluctant to carry out land auctions, as 
they did not profit from it, because all value added was gained by the 
municipal government”. 
State-led land assembly in inner-city redevelopment: The case of 
Enning 
Enning is a neighbourhood located in Guangzhou’s historic centre in Liwan 
district. The Liwan district government originally hoped to demolish the 
majority of existing dwellings and promote a wholesale redevelopment 
project, which was initiated in November 2006. The demolition boundary 
was made public in May 2007 (Information Times 2012). The official notice 
of demolition and relocation was announced in September 2007. There was 
no plan to re-house existing residents on site. According to the district 
government information, the total size of planned areas for the project 
amounted to 11.37 hectare (Liwan District Government 2009), a sizeable 
space in a prime inner-city location. Residents were primarily notified of the 
demolition plan through wall posters around the neighbourhood. The 
redevelopment was heavily top-down and the district government was 
ultimately responsible for the residents’ displacement and land assembly. 
The Guangzhou Land Use and Development Centre was to control the land 
once the land was assembled and ready for auction to find investors 
(Yangcheng Wanbao 2008). Municipal offices were responsible for 
providing relocation dwellings and paying cash compensation. The district 
government made use of promotional events such as the Guangzhou Liwan 
Spring Investment Forum annually held in Hong Kong to promote 
redevelopment projects, including Enning, and invite investors (see for 
instance Invest Guangzhou 2008). 
Initially, 1,950 households were subject to permanent displacement. More 
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than one third (723 households) were living in public rental dwellings, and 
the rest (1,227 households) were house-owners (Information Times 2008).5 
The Enning redevelopment plan was revised in 2011 after having faced 
outcries not only from the local residents but also from the general public 
and media with regard to the planned demolition of architectural heritage 
buildings known to have concentrated in the project area. The district 
government made a compromise and adopted a more culture-oriented 
project, aiming to transform the neighbourhood into a more ‘historic and 
cultural district’. This shifting position was hinted in December 2009 and 
was more concretely manifested in 2011. The Enning redevelopment project 
was further integrated with the city-wide project of restoring a stream that 
was covered decades ago and flew through the neighbourhood (Shin 2014c). 
In this way, a waterfront environment was to be created for visitors who 
were to enjoy facilities and amenities managed by the district government. 
However, these changes to the original redevelopment plan did not result in 
the cancellation of local residents’ displacement. Despite the revision to the 
original plan, the total number of households subject to displacement still 
amounted to 1,823 (Nanfang Daily 2011). 
Local residents’ displacement experience was highly differentiated. Any 
migrants in private rental properties would have been displaced pretty much 
without any compensation and they lost access to the most affordable 
accommodations in inner-city districts. Public tenants were offered 
relocation dwellings where they would remain in the same tenure, but most 
of these dwellings were located further away from Enning. For instance, the 
Guangzhou Municipal Land Resources and Housing Administrative Bureau 
arranged 200 flats at Jinshazhou and 100 at Hengsha village, located about 
                                                 
5  These figures largely referred to permanent Guangzhou residents and not 
temporary migrants who used to rent rooms in part of the neighbourhood. The 
number of migrants was not known at the time of my field research, though 
interviewees hinted at the presence of a sizeable number of them. 
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5~6 kilometres away in a neighbouring administrative district to the 
northeast of Enning; another 100 in the newly constructed Pearl River New 
Town, about 9 kilometres to the east from Enning. Only 95 flats were 
provided in an adjacent area (Nanfang Dushibao 2008). 
As for house-owners, their main compensation options were either the 
exchange of property rights or cash compensation. While the first option 
was preferred provided that houses were located nearby, house-owners were 
initially presented with price-controlled flats (xianjiafang in Chinese)6 at 
Jinshazhou (Yangcheng Wanbao 2008). Not surprisingly, the first 436 
house-owners who signed the compensation agreement by the end of April 
2008 opted for the cash compensation (ibid.). The amount of cash 
compensation turned out to be about 9,000 yuan/m2 (Guangzhou Daily 
2008) and remained so for some years. This rate was far less adequate to 
finance owners’ purchase of second-hand flats of decent standard in 
adjacent neighbourhoods, let alone buying a new flat. 
By November 2008, about 14 months after the announcement of the 
demolition notice, almost half the households subject to displacement 
signed compensation. To further facilitate the displacement progress, in 
2009, the Liwan district government produced additional relocation 
measures, modifying their earlier uncompromising approach to appease 
more defiant residents. This was also partly influenced by the pressure to 
speed up the project pace in preparation for the 2010 Guangzhou Asian 
Games. Low-income households eligible to buy subsidised affordable 
housing (known as jingji shiyongfang in Chinese) could enjoy early 
purchase by jumping queues. Other households were offered the purchase of 
Liwan district’s relocation flats in adjacent neighbourhoods such as 
Baocheng Shadi, another redevelopment site close to Enning. Eventually, 
                                                 
6 Price-controlled flats came with many restrictions on sales, prohibiting owners from 
selling their flats within five years from the date of purchase. Owners also have to hand 
over a hefty sum of money to the government if s/he gains any price advantage upon sales. 
 Page 17 
about 600 house-owner households from Enning were to move to Baocheng 
Shadi, using their cash compensation to finance the purchase of flats 
therein. 
The demolition and relocation notice initially announced in September 2007 
gave it two years for the work to be completed, and this deadline was 
extended by one year every time it approached its expiry date. On the one 
hand, this indicated the reluctance of many local residents to sign the 
compensation agreements, but on the other hand, it also exhibited the 
persistence of the district and municipal governments to complete the task. 
The district and municipal governments subsequently carried out more 
coercive measures. These included the selective demolition of key buildings 
in the central part of the neighbourhood, and the replacement of front doors 
of vacated dwellings with brick walls to create visual effects of 
displacement. Such tactics exercised over a prolonged period of time would 
have increased pressure on remaining residents, forcing them to face the 
inevitability of displacement (see Sakizlioglu and Uitermark 2014 for a 
similar use of symbolic politics in Amsterdam and Istanbul). The 
governments also made use of peer pressure by publicly announcing the list 
applicants who were given the opportunity to move to a subsidised 
affordable housing estate, indicating the full the details of each applicant 
(e.g. name, address, size of dwellings, annual per capita income, etc.) (see 
Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Enning in the midst of demolition (Photographs by the author 
between 2009 and 2011) 
By July 2012, compensation agreements were signed by most residents 
subject to displacement (Guangzhou Daily 2012). The dispossession of local 
inhabitants occurred in a way that failed to respect the residents’ rights to 
stay put in the neighbourhood. The municipal and district governments 
envisaged the establishment of a culture-oriented redeveloped site by 
displacing existing residents, focusing on taking the control of the land to 
promote a project that met their development needs. Comparatively 
speaking, house-owners were more reluctant to move out, as their 
compensation measures were far from adequate to finance decent housing in 
adjacent neighbourhoods. House-owners were content with where they lived 
despite relatively dilapidated conditions. The official compensation 
measures often fell short of taking into account the complex circumstances 
of Enning households, whose property rights became complicated while 
having gone through confiscation, restitution, informal extension and 
undocumented inheritance during the last few decades (see New Express  
Daily 2012 for some of the reported cases). No adequate explanation was 
given from the beginning of the project about the exact nature of the post-
displacement land use, becoming an additional source of residents’ 
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frustration. One homeowner interviewee who has been living in a three-
storey house his father purchased in the 1980s emphatically notes: 
“Who would hope to be subject to demolition? Private owners would 
not want to be subject to demolition forever…If you are to demolish 
this area and use it for a certain purpose, shouldn’t you first let me 
know?…Currently, it is not known who is to develop this 
area…Onlookers also hear that for the same house, there is such a big 
difference in the size of compensation. Why does this kind of thing 
happen? Why those who leave early get 9,800 [yuan/m2 as 
compensation] and those who refuse [to leave] now gets 10,900?…If 
we were given 13,000 originally and let us buy a second-hand flat 
nearby, we would have already left. But, nowadays, 13,000 would not 
allow you to buy a second-hand flat. Nowadays, the cheapest would 
require 18,000…” (Mr. Zhen, interviewed on 31 October 2010)7 
 
Commodification and redevelopment of urbanised villages: The case of 
Pazhou 
Guangzhou, like other cities in the Pearl River Delta region, displays a large 
number of urbanised former villages (chengzhongcun in Chinese), which 
have been previously subsumed by territorial expansion of the urban (Hsing 
2010). The urbanisation of rural villages entailed the expropriation of the 
majority of rural lands to convert them into urban construction lands. 
Village collectives often ended up having a small share of former collective-
owned lands to pursue village businesses, and individual families retained 
their residential land (zhaijidi) to continue their living. Villagers, having lost 
their farmlands, often exercised informal landlordism to raise rental income 
by renting informally extended or reconstructed spaces to migrant tenants 
(Wang et al. 2009). As cities further expanded horizontally, many of these 
                                                 
7 All interviewee names anonymised. 
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former villages came to occupy prime locations, increasing their 
development potential. The subjugation of rural villages to urban 
governments is symptomatic of China’s speculative urbanisation, which is 
still very much nuanced with the co-existence of a more peripheral 
development process, subordinating peri-urban development to the 
hegemony of cities. 
Pazhou in the east end of Haizhu District was one of many former rural 
villages and had been under huge pressure for real estate development. It 
was located close to the Chinese Export Commodities Fair (Pazhou) 
Complex, newly developed to host major international trade exhibitions. 
The Pazhou Complex also constituted the southern end of Guangzhou’s new 
central business district (hereafter CBD) called the Pearl River New Town. 
Pazhou’s redevelopment seemed inevitable, threatening the livelihood of 
about 3,000 villagers as well as migrants, whose total number would reach 
10,000 people during peak times according to the district planning bureau. 
Moreover, Pazhou was shortlisted, along with eight other similar villages, 
for wholesale clearance prior to the opening of the 2010 Asian Games (New 
Express Daily 2010). 
In fact, the Pazhou redevelopment was the conclusion of a decade-long 
expropriation of village lands by the municipal government. Having gone 
through an initial round of farmland expropriation from 1998, the Pazhou 
redevelopment specifically targeted the village’s remaining residential space 
in order to modernise the landscape and promote high-end commercial, 
residential and office developments, bringing the village space more in line 
with the new CBD. Villagers were aware of the imminent demolition 
several years before the actual demolition and relocation, informed by 
newspapers, surveys and government's publicity activities (Mr. Ye 
interviewed on 26 September 2010). A villager notes: “I first heard about 
the demolition and relocation…around 2006 or 2007. In 2007, at the time of 
hearing about demolition and relocation, there was a survey on each 
household to measure the size [of housing space]” (Mr. Ke interviewed on 
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26 September 2010) (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Pazhou in the midst of demolition (Photographs by the author 
between 2009 and 2011) 
While real estate developers were formerly prohibited to partake in the 
redevelopment of urbanised villages until 2006, the Three Olds policy 
enabled them to become a more active participant, as “the government 
needs their financial power and experience to successfully initiate 
restructuring” (Schoon 2013:231). This was evident in Pazhou where the 
redevelopment was carried out by the Poly Real Estate Group (PREG), a 
state enterprise that was part of the elite Poly Group supervised by the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council. The project also involved, as the key partner of the developer, the 
village collective’s economic entity called the Pazhou Jingji Lianshe 
(hereafter PJL) that controlled the collective’s economic assets. The PJL 
was established when a reform policy to reshape village committees took 
place in 2002. 
The total size of the redevelopment site reached 75.76ha. The post-
redevelopment construction space was to rise to 1,850,000m2, seeing a 2.5-
fold increase (GZURO 2013). Upon completion, there would be 720,000m2 
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of high-rise flats, and of these, 320,000m2 were put aside for re-housing 
villagers. The rest of the construction space was for providing high-end 
offices, hotels, international exhibition centres and commercial/cultural 
facilities. The PJL will also claim 460,000m2 of construction space to carry 
out village businesses and generate revenues and rental income (Liang and 
Wang 2013). In principle, the revenues, including rents generated from 
commercial and business premises, will go into the PJL’s business account, 
to be subsequently used for the welfare of villagers who register as 
shareholders of the PJL. 
With the implementation of the Three Olds programme, former urbanised 
villages were encouraged to engage in self-redevelopment, in which village 
collectives would “have the will and means to redevelop themselves, either 
on their own or as a coalition together with real estate companies” (Schoon  
2014:113). A significant milestone of the Pazhou redevelopment was the 
PJL’s announcement of a comprehensive plan on 28 August 2008 for 
compensating villagers’ dwellings and their re-housing. Based on municipal 
regulations, the PJL8’s plan was to receive consent from more than two 
thirds of villagers, but the whole process was top-down and far from 
villagers’ voluntary participation. Consenting villagers were to sign their 
names between 4 and 8 September, 2008, only one week after the 
announcement of the plan. 2,288 registered villagers who were 18 years or 
older at the time were eligible to sign. The initial round of asking for 
consent failed to win the minimum two-thirds support, and the PJL kept 
receiving signatures while executing a massive propaganda campaign. 
Eventually, 1,551 eligible villagers (67.8%) signed the consent by 30 
September 2008. The process of individual agreement on actual 
                                                 
8  The information about the progress of village redevelopment is based on villagers’ 
accounts and in particular, those included in a court verdict, dated 31 December 2010, on a 
civil law-suit that involved a villager’s appeal against her compensation. 
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compensation was slower. By 28 April 2010, about 60% of villagers had 
signed the agreement, and only after a substantial campaign to ensure 
demolition is complete before the opening of the 2010 Asian Games in mid-
November, 98% of villagers signed the agreement by 23 August 2010. 
Those villagers who did not sign the compensation agreement by 30 May 
2010 also risked the loss of 20,000 yuan provided as an incentive payment, 
and therefore, the financial incentive acted as a means to placate those who 
were reluctant to move. Lack of detailed explanations on compensation 
seemed to have prevailed, as one of the displaced villagers revealed: “[to 
find out the compensation information] I went to visit the municipal 
government and the district government many times, but they all sent me to 
the developer and wouldn’t discuss. Village leaders did not help us either” 
(Mr. Peng interviewed on 17 October 2010). Another villager also confirms 
this, stating that “the [PJL] would negotiate with the government and 
developer. We the petite villagers did not have any opportunity to ask any 
questions directly to them [the developer]” (Mr. Ke interviewed on 26 
September 2010). The Three Olds programme’s encouragement for villages 
to engage in self-redevelopment did not seem to have worked. Villagers 
lacked the information on the exact details of the agreement reached 
between the PJL and the developer. As a villager notes: 
“the [redevelopment] contract was between the village cadres and the 
Poly. All of us did not know [the details of the contract], and it was 
never discussed with villagers… Now that all have signed [the 
compensation agreement], we still cannot see the [redevelopment] 
contract. We took the matter to the municipal government, about 300 
plus people went there, asking for the disclosure of the contract 
details, but it was of no use” (Mr. Pan interviewed on 10 October 
2010) 
Concluding discussion: Dispossession as a Precursor to 
Gentrification 
The process of urban accumulation in China produces gentrification, 
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bearing resemblance to new-build gentrification in other countries (see 
Davidson and Lees 2010). However, equating China’s urban redevelopment 
simply with new-build gentrification falls short of identifying the more 
fundamental structural processes of displacement, something that Peter 
Marcuse (2010) emphatically calls for. Dispossession is key to China’s 
speculative urbanisation. In order to raise revenues from the transaction of 
land use rights and to address the political aspiration of the state elites, lands 
are assembled, accompanying displacement of inhabitants (owners and 
users) who are in turn dispossessed of their right to their properties and to 
the city. This is a process that is now on the ascendancy in the global 
capitalism for urban accumulation. Dispossession was an important step 
towards creating a real estate market in a place where no market existed 
before land and housing reform, converting lands into a higher and better 
use in order to capitalise on the rent gaps that began to come into operation. 
This understanding chimes with Anagnost’s (2004) arguments about China’s 
marketisation: 
"In China’s postsocialist development, collectivized property and the 
populations whose livelihood once depended upon it both become 
potential sources of surplus value (as capital and labor). The newly 
privatized sphere of market relations colludes with the power relations 
of the post-Mao state to rechannel value into various kinds of 
entrepreneurial capital" (p.195) 
The local states, especially urban governments and their apparatuses, 
endeavour to promote dispossession, which functions as a key precursor to 
ensuing gentrification. Major capital investment occurs in principle after 
land assembly. Barren lands are created through the dispossession of 
residents and their displacement, and on these lands, commoditised urban 
space is re-written. Land dispossession and residents’ displacement ensure 
that all kinds of complexities associated with the socialist legacies and 
economic transition are removed and a clean sheet is presented to individual 
and corporate investors. Dispossession precipitates urban accumulation and 
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allows the local states to realise developmental ambitions (Shin 2014a). 
Therefore, dispossession inevitably becomes a highly political project. In so 
far as China’s urbanisation is a national project under the auspices of the 
Party State, the central and local states are in this endeavour together. 
Nevertheless, with the administrative power to make decisions on the 
disposition of urban lands for conversion into a ‘higher and better’ use, the 
local states, particularly at the municipal level, become the front-line agents 
of dispossession, supported by sub-municipal administrative and communal 
organs. 
Nevertheless, dispossession occurs in a nuanced way, involving a mix of co-
optation and coercion, or “negotiated consent to displacement and forced 
eviction” (Doshi 2013:848). Local residents in both Enning and Pazhou 
were subject to displacement pressure generated by various tactics that tried 
to coerce and persuade more residents to sign compensation agreements. In 
particular, the example of Pazhou village provides us with a more nuanced 
process of dispossession, reflecting the legacy of China’s socialist era. 
Firstly, it was necessary to co-opt village leaders and villagers (through re-
housing and allowing village businesses for revenue generation) as much as 
possible to minimise resistance and make sure planned land expropriation 
and profit-maximisation could occur. The active role of village collectives in 
the redevelopment of Guangzhou’s urbanised villages reflects the socialist 
legacy in mainland China, where villagers’ collective ownership of the rural 
land was part of the socialisation process during the planned economy era. 
Furthermore, the redevelopment drive was intermediated by village leaders 
who were thought to “have much stronger and more effective means to 
pursue their fellows than any government body”, making use of their 
“familial and clan ties within the village community” (Schoon 2013:230). 
Secondly, the Pazhou redevelopment entailed the loss of villagers’ rights 
(Harvey 2005), that is, the loss of opportunities to flexibly raise rental 
income from directly exercising their informal rights to housing and 
residential land. They were placed under pressure to agree to the decision 
made by the village leaders. In return, however, villagers incorporated in the 
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shareholding system of the PJL would be able to claim redeveloped flats for 
re-housing and also have access to a share of future revenues controlled by 
the PJL after redevelopment. How this would change their views of 
redevelopment remains to be seen. Thirdly, migrant tenants were the biggest 
victims in Pazhou. The informality of rental housing markets in urbanised 
villages helped migrant tenants to have some degree of access to affordable 
housing while they had to cope with structural constraints associated with 
the decades-old hukou system (Wang et al. 2009). In this regard, they were 
dispossessed of their right to affordable housing and environments that were 
more amenable for their settlement after migration to the city (see Schoon 
2013: 236 for the result of a survey on migrants in three urbanised villages). 
Displacement would only drive them away to look for similar types of 
accommodation elsewhere, though the promotion of a series of 
redevelopment projects in a compressed time period would likely make the 
displacees go through what is termed as ‘forced consumption’ primarily due 
to increased costs on alternative accommodations (see Shin 2008). In this 
way, dispossession coupled with displacement would produce multiple 
hardships that not only result in the loss of rights but also in the augmented 
threats to the security of life in the future. 
 
References 
Anagnost A (2004) The corporeal politics of quality (suzhi). Public Culture 
16(2):189-208 
Cao G, Feng C and Tao R (2008) Local “land finance” in China’s urban 
expansion: Challenges and solutions. China & World Economy 16(2):19-30 
Clark E (2005) The order and simplicity of gentrification – a political 
challenge. In: Atkinson R and Bridge G (eds) Gentrification in a Global 
Context: The New Urban Colonialism. London: Routledge, pp. 256–264  
Davidson M and Lees L (2010) New-build gentrification: Its histories, 
trajectories, and critical geographies. Population, Space and Place 16:395-
411 
 Page 27 
Doshi S (2013) The politics of the evicted: Redevelopment, subjectivity, and 
difference in Mumbai’s slum frontier. Antipode 45(4):844-865 
Fang K and Zhang Y (2003) Plan and market mismatch: Urban 
redevelopment in Beijing during a period of transition. Asia Pacific 
Viewpoint 44(2):149–162 
Glass R (1964) Introduction to London: Aspects of Change. London: Centre 
for Urban Studies. Reprinted in Glass, R. (1989) Clichés of Urban Doom 
and Other Essays. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp.133-158 
Glassman J (2006) Primitive accumulation, accumulation by dispossession, 
accumulation by ‘extra-economic’ means. Progress in Human Geography 
30(5):608-625. 
Guangzhou Daily (2012) Relocatee household who refused to hand over 
house after receiving money to buy a house loses a court battle (in Chinese). 
17 July. http://life.dayoo.com/house/201207/17/95255_25043083.htm  
- (2008) The compensation for Enning demolition to reach 
9000yuan/m2 (in Chinese). 20 June 
GZURO (Guangzhou Urban Redevelopment Office) (2013) Pazhou Village. 
http://www.gzuro.gov.cn/azcg/45/852.html 
Hackworth J and Smith N (2001) The changing state of gentrification. 
Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 22:464-477 
Haila A (1999) Why is Shanghai building a giant speculative property 
bubble? International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 23:583-588 
Harvey D (2007) Neoliberalism as creative destruction. The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 610(1):21-44 
- (2006) Comment on commentaries. Historical Materialism 
14(4):157-166 
- (2005) A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford University Press 
- (2003) The new imperialism. Oxford University Press 
- (1978) The urban process under capitalism: A framework for 
analysis. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 2(1-
4):101-131 
He S (2010) New-build gentrification in Central Shanghai: demographic 
changes and socioeconomic implications. Population, Space and Place 
16(5):345-361 
- (2007) State-sponsored gentrification under market transition: The 
 Page 28 
case of Shanghai. Urban Affairs Review 43(2):171-198 
Hsing Y-t (2010) The great urban transformation: Politics of land and 
property in China. Oxford University Press 
Huang X and Yang Y (2010) The characteristics and forming mechanisms of 
gentrification in cities of western China: the case study in Chengdu city (in 
Chinese). Progress in Geography (dili kexue jinzhan) 1532-1540 
Information Times (2012) Is this going to be the final change for Enning’s 
demolition and relocation? (in Chinese). 20 March. 
http://informationtimes.dayoo.com/html/2012-03/20/content_1647582.htm  
-  (2008) Enning’s 75 public housing displacees ‘shake’ new 
houses (in Chinese). 2 July. 
http://informationtimes.dayoo.com/html/2008-
07/02/content_243388.htm 
Invest Guangzhou (2008) Liwan district carrying 41 projects, striving to 
attract Hong Kong investors (in Chinese). 
http://www.investguangzhou.gov.cn/web/vfs//content/contentDetail.jsp?cont
entId=23438&catEncode=001001 
Kovács Z, Wiessner R and Zischner R (2013) Urban renewal in the inner 
city of Budapest: Gentrification from a post-socialist perspective. Urban 
Studies 50(1):22-38 
Lees L (2012) The geography of gentrification: Thinking through 
comparative urbanism. Progress in Human Geography 36(2):155-171 
Lees L, Shin HB and López-Morales E (eds) (2015) Global gentrifications: 
Uneven development and displacement. Bristol: Policy Press 
Lees L, Shin HB and López-Morales E (in press) Planetary gentrification. 
London: Polity Press 
Lefebvre H (2003) The urban revolution (translated by R Bononno). 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Lemanski C (2014) Hybrid gentrification in South Africa: Theorising across 
southern and northern cities. Urban Studies 51(14):2943-2960 
Levien M (2011) Special economic zones and accumulation by 
dispossession in India. Journal of Agrarian Change 11(4):454-483 
Liang Z And Wang Y (2013) Exploring urbanised village redevelopment 
planning: The case of Guangzhou’s Pazhou village redevelopment (in 
Chinese). http://www.cpiso.cn/jsyj/ghsj/2013/6/3/352.shtml 
Lin GCS and Ho SPS (2005) The state, land system, and land development 
 Page 29 
processes in contemporary China. Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 95(2):411-436 
Lin GCS, Li X, Yang FF, and Hu FZY (2014) Strategizing urbanism in the 
era of neoliberalization: state power reshuffling, land development and 
municipal finance in urbanizing China. Urban Studies [online first]. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/ 0042098013513644  
Liwan District Government (2009) Soliciting views on the plan for the 
redevelopment of Enning (in Chinese). 21 December, 
http://www.lw.gov.cn/zwgk/13114/13167/200912/t20091221_97816.htm 
López-Morales E (2011) Gentrification by Ground Rent Dispossession: the 
Shadows Cast by Large Scale Urban Renewal in Santiago de Chile. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 35(2):1-28 
Marcuse P (2010) On gentrification: A note from Peter Marcuse. City 14(1-
2):187-188 
Meng Y-c (2000) Gentrification in Western countries and rehabilitation in 
Beijing city (in Chinese). Journal of Beijing Union University 14(1):24-28 
Nanfang Daily (2011) Complete picture of the new plan for Enning Road in 
Guangzhou revealed (in Chinese). 6 July. http://news.gz.soufun.com/2011-
07-06/5362737_all.html 
-  (2010) For the first time, Guangzhou municipal office of 
three olds regeneration responds to hot spots: the government never 
expects to make money (in Chinese) 24 April. 
http://nf.nfdaily.cn/nfdsb/content/2010-04/24/content_11363483.htm 
-  (2007) Zhang Guangning: Municipal government can make 
advance payment for old city redevelopment (in Chinese). 
http://www.southcn.com/news/gdnews/sd/200701230200.htm 
Nanfang Dushibao (2008) Enning’s demolition, the most transparent and 
fair (in Chinese). 2 July. URL: 
http://gz.oeeee.com/a/20080702/604363_1.html 
New Express Daily (2012) Demolition and relocation in Enning: The final 
see-saw (in Chinese). 21 February. 
http://news.xkb.com.cn/shendu/2012/0221/185196.html 
-  (2010) Guangzhou’s Three Olds Office lists nine urbanised 
 Page 30 
villages for demolition before the Asian Games. 25 February. URL: 
http://news.xkb.com.cn/guangzhou/2010/0225/ 44839.html 
Qiu JH (2002) Consideration of “gentrification” in contemporary Chinese 
renewal (in Chinese). Tropical Geography (redai dili) 22(2):125-129 
Ramanathan U (2009) A word on eminent domain. In Mehta, L. (ed.) 
Displaced by development: Confronting marginalisation and gender 
injustice. New Delhi: Sage, pp.133-145 
Sakizlioglu NB and Uitermark J (2014) The symbolic politics of 
gentrification: the restructuring of stigmatized neighborhoods in Amsterdam 
and Istanbul. Environment and Planning A 46(6):1369-1385 
Shao, Q. (2013) Shanghai gone. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 
Schoon S (2014) Three olds: Experimental urban restructuring with Chinese 
characteristics, Guangzhou and Shenzhen in comparison. In Altrock, U. and 
Schoon, S. (eds) Maturing megacities: The Pearl River Delta in progressive 
transition. Dordrecht: Springer, pp.105-121 
-  (2013) ‘Three olds redevelopment’: Advances in urban 
upgrading in Guangzhou. In Wu F, Zhang F and Webster C (eds) 
Rural migrants in urban China: Enclaves and transient urbanism. 
London: Routledge, pp.223-239 
Shin HB (2014a) Contesting speculative urbanisation and strategising 
discontents. City 18(4-5):509-516 
- (2014b) Urban spatial restructuring, event-led development and 
scalar politics. Urban Studies 51(14):2961-2978 
- (2014c) Elite vision before people: State entrepreneurialism and the 
limits of participation. In Altrock U and Schoon S (eds) Maturing 
megacities: The Pearl River Delta in progressive transition. New 
York: Springer, pp.267-239 
- (2009) Residential redevelopment and entrepreneurial local state: 
The implications of Beijing's shifting emphasis on urban 
redevelopment policies. Urban Studies 46(13):2815-2839 
- (2008) Living on the edge: Financing post-displacement housing in 
urban redevelopment projects in Seoul. Environment and 
Urbanization 20(2):411-426 
Smith N (2002) New globalism, new urbanism: Gentrification as global 
urban strategy. Antipode 34(3):427-450 
- (1979) Toward a theory of gentrification: A back to the city 
 Page 31 
movement by capital, not by people. Journal of the American 
Planning Association 45(4):538-548 
Song W and Wu Q (2010) Gentrification and residential differentiation in 
Nanjing, China. China Geogra. Sci. 20(6):568-576 
Song W and Zhu X (2010) Gentrification in urban China under market 
transformation. International Journal of Urban Sciences 14(2):152-163 
Wainwright O (2013) Zaha Hadid’s mega mall accused of ‘destroying’ 
Beijing’s heritage. The Guardian, 2 August. 
http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/architecture-design-
blog/2013/aug/02/zaha-hadid-destroying-beijing-heritage 
Wang J and Lau SSY (2009) Gentrification and Shanghai’s new middle-
class: Another reflection on the cultural consumption thesis. Cities 26:57-66 
Wang YP and Murie A (2000) Social and spatial implications of housing 
reform in China. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 
24(2):397-417 
Wang YP, Wang Y, and Wu J (2009) Urbanization and informal 
development in China: Urban villages in Shenzhen. International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research 33(4):957-973 
Wu F (2011) Urbanization. In Tay WS and So AY (eds) Handbook of 
contemporary China. Singapore: World Scientific, pp.237-262 
- (2009) Neo-urbanism in the making under China’s market transition. 
City 13(4):418-431 
- (1996) Changes in the Structure of Public Housing Provision in 
Urban China. Urban Studies 33(9):1601-1627  
Wu Q-y and Yin Z-x (2008) The progress of urban gentrification study and 
its future (in Chinese). Human Geography (renwen dili) 23(2):19-25 
Xue D (1999) Consideration of Western gentrification research in our 
country’s socio-spatial research (in Chinese). Planners (guihuashi) 
15(3):109-112 
Yang Y-R and Chang C-h (2007) An urban regeneration regime in China: A 
case study of urban redevelopment in Shanghai’s Taipingqiao area. Urban 
Studies 44(9):1809-1826 
Yangcheng Wanbao (2008) Enning finalises demolition plan and 
compensation price. Average compensation to be 9,000 yuan (in Chinese). 
14 May. http:// www.ycwb.com/news/2008-05/14/content_1887130.htm 
Ye L (2011) Urban regeneration in China: Policy, development, and issues. 
 Page 32 
Local Economy 26:337-347 
Zhan JV (2011) Explaining central intervention in local extra-budgetary 
practices in China. Asian Survey 51(3):497-519 
Zhang X, Hu J, Skitmore M and Leung BYP (2013) Inner-city urban 
redevelopment in China metropolises and the emergence of gentrification: 




List of Figures 
Figure 1: Enning in the midst of demolition (Photographs by the author 
between 2009 and 2011) 
Figure 2: Pazhou in the midst of demolition (Photographs by the author 
between 2009 and 2011) 
 
Acknowledgements 
I thank the participants and audience at the at the following events where 
various versions of this paper were presented: (1) the London workshop on 
‘Toward an Emerging Geography of Gentrification in the Global South’ in 
March 2012, where the paper’s earlier draft was first presented; (2) the 
China Planning Research Group seminar at the Bartlett School of Planning, 
University College London in November 2014; (3) the School of Geography 
seminar, University of Leeds in February 2014. I also thank the students in 
my postgraduate course Cities and Social Change in East Asia for being 
good listeners and raising interesting questions. I’d like to express my 
gratitude to Loretta Lees, Ernesto López-Morales, Jung Won Sonn, Qin 
Shao, Paul Waley, Hyun Kyung Kim, Chaoqun Liu and anonymous 
reviewers for their thoughtful comments and/or helpful suggestions. 
However, I take the sole responsibility for any possible errors in this paper. 
Funding 
 Page 33 
The author acknowledges the financial support from the LSE Annual 
Fund/STICERD New Researcher Award (2009-2011) and the National 
Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government 
(NRF-2014S1A3A2044551). 
